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IP: rationale and problems 
 
Justifications for IP include stimulation and reward of innovation, creativity and 
diffusion of knowledge,
1
 on the basis that society gains economically from 
efficiencies, disclosure and activity encouraged by the limited exclusivity conferred 
by IP.
2
  Another approach is that it is morally valid for persons to be prevented from 
dealing with, or copying, a work without the creator’s consent.
3
  There is a debate, 
however, as to the validity of these justifications, and whether all or some IP rights in 
fact hinder what they purport to encourage.
4
  Further, when the IP rights are rarely 
owned by the creator,
5
 who may have developed the work anyway and may not object 
to some further use or adaptation of it,
6
 the economic and moral arguments appear 
weak.
7
         
 
In addition, the evolution of the IP system has been driven by developed industrialised 
nations, or those seeking to be so, and its structure reflects their present values;
8
 these 
are not suited to encouragement of innovation and creativity in all developed nations, 
                                                 
1
 Cornish, W.R. (2004) “Intellectual Property. Omnipresent, Distracting, Irrelevant?” Clarendon Law 
Lectures, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK (“Cornish”), 9; Shikwati, J.S. “Invisible Wealth” 4  
March 2004 http://www.techcentralstation.be/030404B.html; Report of the Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights “Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy” (“CIPR”) 
<http://www.iprcommission.org> September 2002, 14-17 
2
 See Drahos, P. “Introduction”, (“Drahos”) 4-6 in Drahos, P. and Mayne, R. (eds) (2002) “Global 
Intellectual Property Rights. Knowledge, Access and Development” Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 
and New York (“Drahos/Mayne”) – although Drahos does not accept this argument 
3
 See Chapman, A.R “Approaching intellectual property as a human right: obligations related to Article 
15(1)(c)” Copyright Bulletin, vol XXXV No. 3, July-September 2001 UNESCO Publishing 
(“Chapman”), 8; Garnett, K. Rayner James, J. Davies, G. (1999) (14
th
 ed) “Copinger and Skone James 
on Copyright”, Sweet & Maxwell, London, UK (“Copinger”), 29; and Picciotto, S. “Defending the 
Public Interest in TRIPS and the WTO” (“Picciotto”) in Drahos/Mayne, 183 
4
 See Macdonald, S. “Exploring the Hidden Costs of Patents” (“Macdonald”) in Drahos/Mayne, 13, 15 
and 30; CIPR 96/7, 126/7; Oxfam Discussion Paper 12/01 “Intellectual Property and the Knowledge 
Gap” (“Oxfam”), <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/knowledge/knowledge.htm> (“Oxfam”), 2  
5
 But by publishers, investors and employers; see Chapman, 20-1 and re UK position, section 39(1) 
Patents Act 1977 (“PA”) and section 11(2) Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (“CDPA”)  
6
 Eg comments of Alex Kapranos of Franz Ferdinand, presentation at University of Edinburgh 29 April 
2004 (transcript shortly to be released)  
7
 see Chapman, 22  
8
 See CIPR 14-21, Chapman, 7. Attempts for a more inclusive approach, with revisions to the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1883 (“Paris Convention”) and Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1971, (“Berne Convention”) largely failed – see 
Chapman, 9 and Cornish, 3       
 4 
much less the developing regions, or in all fields of activity.
9
  Concern in this regard 
has increased following the drive by some developed countries and IP owners for 
international minimum standardisation of IP protection,
10
 leading to the TRIPS 
agreement.
11
            
 
Key contemporary global issues fuelling the debate as to the role of IP are access to 
patented medicines in developing countries;
12
 the function of patents and plant variety 
rights in developing regions’ agriculture and in access to food;
13
 the impact on global 
society of multinational corporations, with power stemming in part from brands;
14
 the 
relationship between IP rights and traditional knowledge and folklore;
15
 and the 
ability of copyright owners to restrict some further use, adaptation and exploitation, in 
further creativity and education, of material apparently freely available on the 
internet.
16
  There is particular concern that such reliance on copyright can lead to de 
facto private control of the underlying information.
17
  From the commercial 
perspective, there is concern at use of wide patents to restrict further innovation;
18
 use 
of patents and copyright to prevent competition in and development of other 
                                                 
9
 Note that even in developed countries, IP protection or regulation has not always been considered a 
key part of commercial growth – often the contrary – see Pretorius, W. “TRIPS and Developing 
Countries: How Level is the Playing Field?” (“Pretorius”) 184 in Drahos/Mayne.  See also Correa, 
C.M. “Pro-competitive Measures under TRIPS to Promote Technology Diffusion in Developing 
Countries” (“Correa”), 40/41, in Drahos/Mayne; Picciotto, 224 and Paine, T. (1996 ed) “Rights of 
Man” Wordsworth Classic of World Literature Wordsworth Editions Ltd, Ware, Herts, UK, 52.   
10
 due to concerns re free riding and piracy (see Braga, C.A.P (1989) “The Economics of Intellectual 
Property Rights and the GATT: a View from the South”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 22 
(2) (“Braga”) in Towse, R and Holzhammer, R (eds) (2002) “The Economics of Intellectual Property  
vol IV Competition and International Trade” The International Library of Critical Writing in 
Economics 145, Cheltenham, United Kingdom, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd (“Towse”) 243-64, and 
driven by the interests of large industry (see Drahos, 4), and desire for matters to be include in the 
WTO framework with its dispute resolutions procedures – CIPR, 157.  See Story, A. “Don’t Ignore 
Copyright, the ‘Sleeping Giant’ on the TRIPS and International Educational Agenda” (“Story”), 133 in 
Drahos/Mayne and Sherwood, R.M. (1990) “Intellectual Property and Economic Development” 
Westview Special Studies in Science, Technology, and Public Policy. Westview Press Inc, Colorado, 
USA and Oxford, UK (“Sherwood”), 3-4 re lobbying by IP owners. 
11
 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Annex 1 C to Marrakesh WTO Agreements 1994 
<http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf>     
12
 Oxfam Section 1, para 2   
13
 CIPR, 57-65 
14
 Klein, N. (2001) “No Logo” Flamingo, Great Britain (“Klein”) 64, 97-8, 118, 122, 130, 166, 176, 
227, 340, 361 
15
See Gibson, J. "Traditional Knowledge and the International Context for Protection", (2004) 1:1 
SCRIPT-ed, @: <http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrb/script-ed/docs/TK.asp>, introduction and para 1.4  
(“Gibson”) 
16
 See Oxfam Section 1, para 2; Cornish, 60-61; Chapman 22 
17
 Oxfam Section 1, para 2; Cornish, 60-61; Chapman 22   
18




 use of patents and copyright to limit the growth of market entrants and 
competitors in networked and standardised industries;
20
 and enforcement of IP rights 




  More 
generally, there is concern at use of IP to exclude key technology from the public 
domain.
23
   
 
Should and could IP be restricted?  
 
While IP plays a part in creating these situations, other factors such as lack of 
infrastructure, finance and education
24
 also bear some responsibility.  Further, 





 and also limits on when the rights can be enforced.
27
  The 
                                                 
19
 but see IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG (“IMS”) 29 April 2004 
<http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/gettext.pl?lang=en&num=79959570#c19010418&doc> 
20
 Cotter, T.F. (1999) “Intellectual Property and the Essential Facilities Doctrine” Antitrust Bulletin, 
XLIV (1) Spring, 211-50 (“Cotter”) in Towse, 202-4  
21
 See generally re monopoly Bishop, S. and Walker, M. (2002) (2
nd
 ed) “The Economics of EC 
Competition Law: Concepts, Applications and Measurement”, Sweet & Maxwell, UK (“BW”), 11, 17, 
21-24, 27-8,33; Malloy, R.P. “The Limits of Science in Legal Discourse – A Reply to Posner”, 181, 
and Evensky, J. “The Role of Law in Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy: Natural Jurisprudence and 
Utility”, (“Evensky”) 211 in Malloy, R.P and Evensky, J. (eds) (1994) “Adam Smith and the 
Philosophy of Law and Economics” Kluwer Academic Publishers The Netherlands (“Malloy”); 
although it is rare that IP rights will give rise to a monopoly in the competition law sense – see Cornish, 
W. R. and Llewelyn, D. (2003) (5
th
 edition) “Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks 
and Allied Rights” Sweet & Maxwell, London, UK, 39 but note also Intel Corp v VIA Technologies 
[2003] 12 and 33, and IMS  
22
 See generally re oligopoly BW, 27-8 
23
 Eg, patenting by Celera re human genome cf Human Genome Project under which all information 
should be publicly available; see Sulston, J. “Forever Free” 
http://www.biotech.ubc.ca/db/bioethics/patentarticles.html, Jasny, B. R. and Kennedy, D. “The Human 
Genome” http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/summary/291/5507/1153.  See also Greenpeace: UN 
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.  
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Intellectual Property and human rights.  Report of the Secretary-
General.  E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/12 14 June 2001 
<http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord2001/documentation/commission>  (“Report on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights”), para III, D, 1; Chapman 22 
24
 See CIPR 30, 31, 35, 38-9 
25
: Eg article 12 TRIPS (copyright), article 33 TRIPS (patent), article 18 TRIPS (trade mark); article 46 
Council Regulation on Community Trade Mark (EC) 40/94 (“CTM Regulation”); re UK, section 25(1) 
PA, section 12 CDPA and section 42 Trade Marks Act 1994 (“TMA”)   
26
 Eg article 28 TRIPS (patent), article 9 TRIPS and article 9 Berne Convention (copyright) and article 
16 TRIPS (trade mark); article 9 CTM Regulation; section 60 PA, section 10 TMA and sections 16 and 
17 CDPA.      
27
 parallel importing: section 12 TMA (but EEA only), article 13 CTM Regulation; experimental use: 
(US, Roche Products Inc v Bolar Pharmaceutical Co Inc (1984) and Madey v Duke University (2002), 
 6 
latter provide some potential solutions to problems considered – for example, 





 and as the basis for use of IP protected material for 
some experimental and research purposes.   
 
However, these do not deal with all concerns,
30
 and also do not exist in all IP systems.  
Even where they do, it may be impractical for those seeking access to IP to 
contemplate court proceedings to take advantage of them, because of time, cost and 
commercial factors.     
 
As a result, and with the evolution of more globally focussed social norms and 
standards
31
 (partly fuelled by new technologies increasing awareness),
32
 pressure 
mounts for a review of IP.
33
  The goal in any such review should be to produce a 
system which is less focussed on the needs of corporations and developed world 
economies, and which addresses the challenges of new technology, commercial 
reality, global poverty and need in a more equitable way.
34
   
 
                                                                                                                                            
section 69.1 Japanese Patent Law, article 11.2 German Patent Act 1981 and sections 60(2)(a) and (b) 
PA; compulsory licensing - sections 48 and 48A PA and sections 135A-H CDPA; TRIPS - general 
exceptions - article 13 (copyright), article 17 (trade mark) and article 30 (patent), background 
provisions articles 7 and 8(1); no provision re parallel importing (article 6) and only permission for 
compulsory licensing (article 31).  
28
 See Doha Declaration Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health, adopted 14 November 
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 
<http//www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm> (“the Doha 
Declaration”), articles 5b, c and 6.  This is considered further below.  
29
 See Liebowitz, S. J. “Alternative Copyright Systems: The Problems with a Compulsory License” 31 
August 2003 <http://www.utdallas.edy/~liebowit/intprop/complpff.pdf (“Liebowitz”) 
30
 Eg limitation on experimental use defence re commercial trials; often need for court action to obtain 
compulsory licence if IP owner unwilling  
31
 See Malloy, R.P. “Adam Smith and the Modern Discourse of Law and Economics” (“Malloy1”), 137 
in Malloy 
32
 as has previously been the case – see 1968 activity and the role of television: 
http://books.guardian.co.uk/reviews/history/0,6121,1194096,00.html review of Kurlansky, M (2004) 
“1968: The Year That Shook The World” Jonathan Cape, UK  
33
 See eg CIPR i.  See also Macdonald, 13; Love, J. “Access to Medicines and Compliance with the 
WTO TRIPS Accord: Models for State Practice in Developing Countries”, 75-86 in Drahos/Mayne; 
Drahos, P. “Negotiating Intellectual Property: Between Coercian and Dialogue”, (“Drahos1”) 179 in 
Drahos/Mayne.      
34
 See also Helfer, L.R. “Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence”) 5 MINN. 
INTELL. PROP. REV 47 (2003) at http://mipr.umn.edu/archive/v5n1/Helfer.pdf (“Helfer”), 48, 58; 
CIPR 163 
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 agendas could produce a system which, in 
theory, was more balanced and addressed contemporary concerns.  Owing to the 
economic failure,
37
 however, and inflexibility
38
 of the former communist societies, 
and the lack of mainstream feminist agendas, such arguments have not to date played 
a major role in the IP debate, save in respect of collective rights and traditional 
knowledge.
39
  Further, given the present power of multinational corporations and 
conventional western, capitalist, male perspectives in the international IP owning 
community,
40
 it is unlikely that imposing such a new regime, without dialogue and 
widespread international support, would be practically effective, whatever its 
theoretical appeal. 
 
In addition, the economic rationales for the present IP system cannot be wholly 
discounted, particularly given, again, the present role of large corporations in 
commercialising innovation and creativity, at least in the developed world.
41
  Further, 
if IP protection is available and subject to a favourable enforcement regime
42
 in some 
countries and not others, businesses will at least consider relocating to these new 
countries, and ceasing activity in or relationships with others.
43
  For this reason, 
practical change will be impossible without the support of the main industrialised 
nations, including the United States. 
 
                                                 
35
 See Shestack, J. “The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights” (“Shestack”) in Symonides, J. 
(ed) (2002) “Human Rights: Concepts and Standards” Dartmouth Publishing Co Ltd, Aldershot, 
England and Ashgrove Publishing Co, Vermont, USA and UNESCO, Paris (“Symonides), 40-1 
36
 See Patmore, G. “Identifying Rights for the 21
st
 Century”, in Galligan, B. and Sampford, C. (eds) 
“Rethinking Human Rights” (1997) The Federation Press, Sydney, Australia, (“Galligan”) 107-112 
37
 See Cornish, 3  
38
 See Mullerson, R. “Perspectives on Human Rights and Democracy in the Former Soviet Republics” 
in Pogany, I. (ed) “Human Rights in Eastern Europe”, (1995) Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, Aldershot, 
Hants/Vermont USA, 51- 57 
39
 See Gibson 
40
 See footnote 10 above 
41
 See Sherwood, 52, Gutterman, A. (1997) “Inter-Firm Co-operation. Competition Law, and Patent 
Licensing: A US-EC Comparison” in S Deakin and J Michie (eds) “Contracts. Co-operation and 
Competition:studies in Economics, Management and Law”, Oxford: Oxford University Press 379-91; 
139-160, (“Gutterman”) in Towse, 141-2  
42
 eg legislation restricts export to limit parallel importing 
43
 See Ingdahl, W. “Patents and Life” 6 May 2004 <http://www.techcentralstation.be/050604A.html> 
 8 
Indeed, imposition of change may be counterproductive, particularly in respect of 
patents, where there is a real choice as to whether to patent or rely on trade secrets.  
While the latter involves foregoing the benefits of a patent, it avoids disclosing details 
of the technology to competitors for their use after the patent term has expired.  As a 
result, the public  also loses the benefit of that knowledge.
44
      
 
As is considered below, there has been some use of competition law and human rights 
to address IP issues of the nature considered, both in individual situations and in 
support of a more formal limitation of IP.  There is a debate, however, as to whether it 
is jurisprudentially valid for IP, arguably a form of property, to be reduced by other 
legal doctrines.
 45





is a higher, more basic doctrine than IP; if so, there is less theoretical basis for 
objecting to changes to IP, which, as the exception, should be restricted as necessary 
(some rights potentially more than others) to enable appropriate operation of the other 
doctrines.    
 
Further consideration will now be given to the present relationships of competition 
and IP, and human rights and IP; present solutions to what are seen as IP problems; 
and the extent to which such solutions are and could be workable, or whether 
alternatives are still required.                      
 
Role of Competition law 
 
                                                 
44
 See Sherwood, 18, 20; see article 39 TRIPS re protection of trade secrets. 
45
 See Cornish, 2; MacCormick, Sir N “On the Very Idea of Intellectual Property: an Essay according 
to the Institutionalist Theory of Law”, (“MacCormick”), 
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/script/newscript/online.htm> 30, 32-34, Epstein, R.A (1982) “Private Property 
and the Public Domain: The Case of Antitrust” in J.R. Pennock and J.W.Chapman (eds) Ethics, 
Economics, and the Law: Nomos XXIV, Chapter 3, New York: New York University Press, 48-82, 69-
103 in Towse, 76-81, 85-91 
46
 See Resolution 
2001/21http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.SUB.2.RES.2001.21.En?Ope
ndocument (“2001 Resolution”) article 3; 
47
 See Cornish, 113-4 
 9 
There has been much discussion and case law on the relationship between IP and 
competition, and the use of competition law tools to address areas of concern.
48
  This 
has taken place in developed and developing regions, particularly regarding parallel 
importing of generics and patented products, and compulsory licensing, in the 
accessing medicines debate;
49
 unjustified restrictions on competitors entering separate 
markets for which use of IP is required and consumer demand is not met;
50
 parallel 
importing of luxury branded goods;
51
 compulsory licensing to require greater sharing 
of IP regarding some uses of and rights over information;
52
 the balance between 
encouraging multilateral collaboration and preventing restriction of innovation in a 
particular field;
53
 and restriction on IP owners’ abilities to enforce rights if the right 
itself confers market power.
54
  In each case a balance has been struck between 
competing priorities,
55
 with key factors also coming from the immediate environment, 
for example preservation of free competition within the European Community.
56
  The 
relationship has also been considered by governmental commissions and enquiries in 
the developed world.
57
      
                                                 
48
 See Cotter 
49
 as was seen in the Doha Declaration.  However, attempts continue to enable import of generics where 
no manufacturing capability to exploit compulsory licence.  See “Implementation of paragraph 6 of the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health” Decision of the General Council at 30 
August 2003.  See also litigation in South Africa, which was ultimately settled, regarding Medicines 
and Related Substances Control Act (As Amended) 1997 (considered in detail in Murakyembe, H. and 
Kanja, G.M. “Implications of the TRIPS Agreement on the Access to Cheaper Pharma Drugs by 
Developing Countries: Case Study of South Africa  v The Pharmaceutical Companies” Zambia Law 
Journal vol 34, 2002, 111 (“Murakyembe”); cf debate regarding compulsory licensing of anthrax in US  
pursuant to 28 U.S.C 149 - see <www.flonnet.com/fl1824/18241020.htm>  
50
 See IMS 
51
 See Levi Strauss & Co v Tesco Stores Ltd [2003] R.P.C. 18 (“Levi”)  
52
 See Copinger, 1584.  Attempts to introduce compulsory licence in EC Database Directive (96/9) 
failed after lobbying from publishers – see Mirchin, D “The European Database Directive Sets the 
Worldwide Agenda”, <http://www.nfais.org/publications/white_papers_2.htm>3.  See also Colston, C 
“Sui Generis Database Right: Ripe for Review?” <http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/01-3/colston.html> and 
Liebowitz      
53
 See article 81 EC Treaty and block exemptions re Technology Transfer (Regulation 240/96, OJ 1996 
L31/2 and proposed new Technology Transfer Block Exemption and draft IP Guidelines (2003/C 
235/04, OJ C235/10 1.10.2003 due to come into effect on 1 May 2004 ); note Jacquemin, A. (1997) 
“Cooperative Agreements in R& D and European Antitrust policy” European Economic Review, 32, 
551-60, in Towse, 129-138, 129-137, and Gutterman, 140, 144 –restrictions may be counterproductive 
54
 See RTE and ITP v E.C Commission [1995] 4 CMLR 718; Intel Corp v VIA Technologies [2003] 12 
and 33; Philips Electronics NV v Ingman Ltd [1998] 2 CMLR 839 
55
 Drahos considered one aspect of the balance, noting that if IP is too strong then there will be 
monopoly costs, if it is too weak then there will be free riding and under investment: see Drahos1, 162   
56
 Korah, V. (1986) “EEC Competition Policy – Legal Form or Economic Efficiency” , Current Legal 
Problems, 39, 85-109, (“Korah”) in Towse, 104-128, 104, 110      
57
 See US 2002 hearings “Competition and Intellectual Property and Policy in the Knowledge Based 
Economy”; Australian Report of Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee.   
 10 
 
The basic function of competition law, however, is to deliver economic objectives.
58
 
There are conflicting theories of economics and competition,
59
 which can be used by 
different sides of the IP debate.  The Chicago school focuses on the need for 
efficiency,
60
 supporting encouragement of innovation theories of IP: if the outcome of 
a strategy is efficient, then the fact that this may have local moral and social 
disadvantages may be irrelevant.
61
  This justification for IP breaks down, however, if 
the technology, work or brand is not adequately exploited, and is thus removed from 
the public domain without any wider economic benefit for society,
62
 or if the efficient 
lack of duplication leads to inflexibility of thought.
63
  An alternative objective, 
protection of the consumer by increased choice and information,
64
 is relied upon by 
those seeking better use of online material
65
 and cheaper branded imported goods.
66
  
A third theory, protection of competitors,
67
 is one of the arguments used by those 
seeking compulsory licences,
68
 and objecting to enforcement,
69
 of IP rights.  A fourth 
theory is that economics is to mirror and deliver evolving norms and morality,
70
 
which is of potential assistance to those attacking IP in the medical and education 
fields.                
 
                                                 
58
 See BW, 11-21 
59
 See BW, 24; Malloy1, 132 
60
 See Korah, 104-5,  Malloy1, 132-4    
61
Malloy1, 128,  Posner, R.A. “Law and Economics Is Moral” 170, 174-5 in Malloy, and Posner, R.A. 
“Rebuttal to Malloy”, 187; in Malloy  
62
 Kamperman Sanders, A. (1997) “Unfair Competition Law. The Protection of Intellectual and 
Industrial Creativity” Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK, 101-104, Jacquemin 132 
63
 Jacquemin, 134-5 
64
 See Whish, R. (2001) (4
th
 ed) “Competition Law”, Butterworths, UK (“Whish”), 16-17 
65
 This argument has been rejected by the EC regarding copyright in online material: see Software 
Directive (91/250), article 4; Copyright Directive (96/9) articles 5 and 7, Copyright and the Information 
Society Directive, 2001/29 (articles 3 and 4) – online copies are deemed to be services, not goods; see 
also Sherwood, 52 – what may benefit the consumer may have detrimental effects elsewhere.  
66
 See Opinion of Advocate General in Zino Davidoff SA v A&G Imports and Kallay, D. “Levi Strauss 
v Tesco: At a Difficult Juncture of Competition, IP and Free Trade Policies” E.C.L.R.  2002.23(4), 193   
67
 See eg Whish, 18 
68
 See IMS paras 26, 27, 28, 33, 39-42 but note ECJ in para 48 – key requirement is resulting consumer 
detriment  
69
 See footnote 54  
70
 Malloy1, 121, 126, 128/9, 133/4, 137 and Malloy, R.P. “Is Law and Economics Moral – Humanistic 
Economics and a Classical Liberal Critique of Posner’s Economic Analysis” in Malloy, 156, 160, 
Evensky, J. “Professor Malloy, Judge Posner, and Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy” (“Evensky1”); 
192; in Malloy; see Whish,  16/17   
 11 
As a result of such divergence of theories and goals, it is unlikely that a single 
theoretical basis will emerge for competition law alone to restrict IP rights.  Given the 
history of competition, economics and IP, it may not indeed be necessary for one 
approach to be identified for use of competition law to be valid.
71
  If the present 
piecemeal approach continues, however, it is unlikely that future use of competition 
would achieve uniform support, and prospects of adoption and implementation would 
decline.   
 
Even if a single theoretical solution could be found, the different challenges faced by 
encouragement, development and commercialisation of innovation in developing and 
developed countries,
72
 suggest that global implementation would be problematic.  
Attempts to develop international competition law in this field have failed, through 
lack of support from developed countries,
73
 although there are more informal co-
operation arrangements.
74
  Support remains, however, for more formalised 
multilateral co-operation in terms of competition and IP involving the developing 
world, while recognising that the needs of developed and developing countries 
differ.
75
    
 
Finally, further intervention in the operation of global markets by regulators, courts 
and legislators, even if theoretically correct and desirable, and practically feasible, is 
                                                 
71
 See for example the elision of theories by the EC Commission in XXIst Report on Competition 
Policy (1991), point 3 
72
 See Braga, 411-416; Correa, 41; Sherwood, 159-173 and 175-177; CIPR, 20-4   
73
 See failure of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to develop 
International Code on Technology Transfer – see Lea, G. “Digital Millennium or Digital Dominion.  
The Effect of IPRs in Software on Developing Countries” in Drahos/Mayne, 151 – history seemed to 
repeated itself with the impasse at  Cancun - see Ministerial statement adopted 14 September 2003 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_20_e.doc> and  
<http://www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2065723>   
74
 Eg regard being had by EC Commission to US practices: see EC Commission’s press release 
IP/00/1376 29 November 2000; see also Bellamy, C. and Child, G.; (2001) (5
th
 ed) “European 
Community Law of Competition”, Sweet & Maxwell, UK (“Bellamy and Child”), 39 and 613, with the 
Commission having regard to Antitrust Guidelines for Cooperation between competitors when framing 
new guidelines for horizontal cooperation agreements; co-operation between UK and Canada, see 




 See Maskus, K.E. and Lahouel, M. “Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights in 
Developing Countries: Interests in Unilateral Initiatives and a WTO Agreement”, 1, 2, 6, 9-16, 19-22 
<http://www.worldbank.org/research/abcde/washington_12/pdf_files/maskus.pdf>   
 12 
unlikely to be acceptable to multinational corporations, who would therefore likely 
lobby against the introduction of the system.
76
  Further, courts and legislators are 
unsuited, due to a lack of specialist economic expertise,
77
 to dealing with the complex 
questions of market definition,
78
 market operation and licence terms,
79
 particularly in 
the dynamic and innovative markets which would be involved in IP questions.
80
  
While regulators would be better placed to deal with such matters,
81
 it is arguably 
inappropriate for fundamental questions involving restriction of rights to be decided, 
at least in the first instance, outside the legal framework.   
        
Role of human rights 
 
Human rights and IP has received significant attention in the accessing medicines
82
 
and traditional knowledge debates.
83
  This reflects the global realisation that 
deprivation of life, health and property in such circumstances is immoral, irrespective 
of other justifications.  In addition, throughout the world, concern at restrictions on 
access to and some uses of copyright material
84
 and control of software
85
 has led to 
argument based on rights to information, education and free expression.  Such 
concepts initially appear better suited to countering some forms of IP, and delivering a 
solution to society’s concerns, than an economic model.     
                                                 
76
 as they have done in the past in this field – see above   
77
 See Korah, 111, 116 
78
 Eg EC Commission Notice on Market Definition; United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207; 
Continental Can ([1972] CMLR D11; Bellamy and Child, 685-7, 691; United States v Eastman Kodak 
Co., 63 F.3d 95 (2d Cir., 1995) 
79
 See Gallini, N.T. and Trebilcock, M.J. (1998) “Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy: 
A Framework for the Analysis of Economic and Legal Issues”, in R.D.Anderson and N.T.Gallini  
(eds),  Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge-Based Economy, Chapter 
2, Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 17-61(“Gallini”)in Towse, 24 - 68, 48-50; Sherwood, 32; 
Armitage, P. “Regulating Terms of Supply – When can Copyright Owners Refuse to Licence?” (1993) 
Australian Journal of Corporate Law Vol 3 No 3, 91, 92 re findings of Hilmer Committee     
80
 See BW, 26, 35, 37; Gallini, 32/3  
81
 Eg EC Commission due to their activities pursuant to Regulation 17/62 but see also Korah, 110-115 
re lack of economic rigour on the part of the EC Commission   
82
 See UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.  Access to medication in the context of pandemics 
such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. Commission on human rights resolution 2003/29.    
<http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.RES.2003.29.En?Opendocument> 
83
 Eg <http://shr.aaas.org/tek/connection.htm>;  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
“Human Rights and Trade” for Cancun, Mexico, 10-14 September 2003, 14-16 
84
 See CIPR, 99-104, 105-110 
85
 See CIPR, 104-5  
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Are such concerns, however, of legal relevance?  There is significant consensus 











 and also the 
rights to benefits of science
91
 and to development,
92
 although these are less 
widespread.  That said, the existence of such rights is merely the start, not the end, of 
legal issues.  The Vienna Declaration provides that all human rights are to be 
universal;
93
 no guidance is therefore available as to how conflicts between rights are 
to be resolved.  This is highly relevant to the IP debate, as the rights to life, health, 
benefits of science, development and free expression may be inconsistent with the 
rights to property of patent, copyright or plant variety owners.   
 
Further, the consumer and competitor also have a relevant right to enjoy their own 
property which could be improperly stifled by the property right of the IP owner.  As 
private rights of individuals have been afforded higher protection than commercial 
rights,
94
 it is arguable that an individual’s wish to educate themselves and others, or to 
develop their own second generation software, should be a legitimate exercise of their 
human right to property.  To the extent that a property right of the IP owner should be 
reduced in such situations, there are then questions of the appropriate form of 
compensation, if any, to be paid, and by whom.
95
   
                                                 
86
 European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (“ECHR”), article 2; International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights 1966 (“ICCPR”), article 6; American Declaration on Rights and Duties of Man 
1948, (“ADRDM”),article 1; American Convention on Human Rights 1969 (“ACHR”), article 4(1); 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights 1948 (“UDHR”), article 3; and African Charter of Human and 
People’s Rights 1981 (“African Charter”), article 4.      
87
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (“ICESCR”), article 12; 
ADRDM, article 11; Additional Protocol to ACHR, article 10; UDHR, articles 24 and 25; and African 
Charter, article 16(1). 
88
 Protocol to ECHR, article 1; ACHR, article 21; UDHR , article 17; and African Charter, article 14 
89
 ECHR, article 10; ICCPR, article 17; ADRDM, article 4; ACHR, article 13; UDHR, article 19; and 
African Charter, article 9 
90
 Protocol to ECHR, article 2; ICESCR, article 13; ADRDM, article 12; Additional Protocol to ACHR, 
article 13, UDHR, article 26; and African Charter, article 17 
91
 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 1993 (“Vienna Declaration”), article 11; ICESCR, 
article 15(1)(b); Additional Protocol to ACHR, article 14(1)(b); and UDHR, article 27(1) 
92
 Vienna Declaration, article 10; ACHR, article 26; and African Charter, article 22   
93
 articles 1 and 5 
94
See Campbell v MGN Limited [2004] UKHL 22, para 148  
95
 See Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden [1984] 7 EHHR 256 – fair balance to be drawn between the 
fundamental right, the interest and welfare of the individual to own and enjoy property and the public 
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The potential for conflict between IP and human rights is supported by the findings of 
the UN Sub-Commission for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights that the 
implementation of TRIPS is inconsistent with international human rights obligations; 
by its reminder to governments of the primacy of human rights obligations over 
economic policies and agreements, and its urging of governments to ensure the 
implementation of TRIPS and national IP legislation is done in a way which protects 
the social function of IP.
 96
  As against this, however, there is debate over whether 
some IP rights can themselves be human rights, to the extent that they protect and 
reward innovators and creators, consistent with rights in international instruments.
97
    
 
More immediate, and no less problematic, is the fact that most human rights in 
instruments are not absolute and contain internal balancing requirements.
98
  Thus even 
if a particular right is relevant, and should take precedence over an opposing IP right, 
it is by no means certain that the desired outcome will be achieved.  That said, the fact 
that internal balancing acts often involve requirements similar to those mentioned 
above, such as protection of health and wider public concerns,
99
 suggest that if the 
human rights were to prevail over an IP right, then victory would follow.              
 
Thus, as noted by the UN, a key factor is the basic relationship between human rights 
and IP.  While the UN stated that human rights should prevail on the basis of 
                                                                                                                                            
interest Cf  Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper  Silesia (1926 Ser A no 7) 
Permanent Court of International Justice – expropriation if it is necessary for public utility. See also 
Malloy 1, 135    
96
 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Intellectual Property and human rights, Sub-Commission 
on Human Rights Resolution 2000/7 (“2000 Resolution”) 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/c462b62cf8a07b13c12569700046704e?Opendocum
ent>  (articles 2, 3 and 6) and 2001 Resolution articles 3, 4 and article 5 (reflecting previous resolution 
save article 5 urges states to ensure that implementation of TRIPS does not conflict with human rights).  
97
 consistent with article 27(2) UDHR and article 15(1)(c) ICESCR and see also 2000 Resolution article 
1.  See Chapman, 6, 10-12; and British Copyright Council in Addendum to the Report on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/12/Add.1 3 July 2001, 
<http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord2001/documentation/commission/e-cn4-sub2-2001-12->, para III, A, 4 
(“Addendum to Report on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”) cf Quaker United Nations 
Office/Friends World Committee for Consultation in Addendum to Report on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights para B, 1.    
98
Eg article 10 and article 1 Protocol 1 ECHR, article 6 ICCPR 
99
Eg article 10 ECHR  
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international law, they are not always seen to be respected, even with what from a 
liberal democratic perspective are established and uncontroversial rights, such as the 
freedom from torture
100
 and freedom of political expression.
101
  Further, the argument 
that human rights are supreme is assumed to be based on the relevant human rights 
being peremptory international norms.
102
  Even if this correct, it is not a resulting 
principle of international law that all treaties must be in accordance with all human 
rights.
103
  In addition, as international human rights law has focussed on practical 
questions of delivery and enforcement,
104
 rather than the theoretical questions of the 
basis for rights and what they should be, it is unclear what would be the grounds for 
supremacy of all or any human rights over IP.
105
    
 
Perspectives on the supremacy issue vary with the underlying basis for human rights.  
For example, there is less concern at introduction of new or restricted IP rights if one 




 approach to human rights, provided the 
necessary formalities are completed and balancing acts carried out.  More 
fundamental questions are raised by natural law
108
 and natural rights
109
 theories, 
which entail inalienable human rights, to which IP must be secondary.  The precise 
nature of these inalienable rights, however, is not taught; and to the extent that detail 
is available, for example, in the Lockean natural rights trilogy,
110
 problems still exist, 
with the rights to property and life in potential conflict in the accessing medicines 
debate.  
   
                                                 
100
See eg <http://www.ibanet.org/humri/WebHRIDetails.asp?ID=74> 
101
 See eg <http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/syria/> 
102
 See Davidson, S (1993) “Human Rights” Open University Press, Buckingham, UK and Bristol, PA, 
USA (“Davidson”), 52-59  
103
 See footnote 102. International law is unhelpful as to practical implications of another treaty, or 
national law, which is inconsistent with human rights.  Treaties are simply assumed not to conflict, and 
will be interpreted in good faith to produce consistent outcome (article 31 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties 1969) 
104
 Davidson 26, 43, 45, 164-5 – but see Kent, A. “China, the United Nations and Human Rights” 
(1999) University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, USA (“Kent”), 184-5 re limits of enforcement 
105
 See Davidson, 24-5 regarding the importance of the underlying theory of human rights in respect of 
questions of ambit and enforceability. 
106
 Shestack, 38-40 ] 
107
 Tay, A. E-S. “Human Rights Problems: Moral, Political, Philosophical”, (“Tay”) in Galligan, 26-7  
108
 Shestack, 36 
109
 Shestack, 36-8 
110
 See Eide, A. “Economic and Social Rights” in Symonides, 110 and Shestack, 36-8 
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 are most relevant, particularly in combination 
with the evolving norms theories of economics,
115
 to building a theoretical basis for 
contemporary interface between IP and human rights.  By this approach, a societal 
model would be developed and values chosen, followed by identification of 
inalienable human rights for that society.  It would then be appropriate for necessary 
restrictions to be made to IP to ensure that such rights were delivered.   
 
At a practical level, however, it is unlikely that such a model could achieve 
widespread support.  Notwithstanding progress with the Vienna Declaration, there 
remains a variety of moral perspectives, international political regimes and attitudes to 
the role of human rights.
116
  Human rights are not part of Marxist socialist doctrine;
117
 
the emergence of the right to development
118
 and recognition of the differing needs of 
indigenous communities
119
 are at early stages; and in liberal democracies in the 
developed world
120
 concern is being expressed at erosion of the function of 
democracy by a rights culture, with matters removed from parliament and the 
executive, and at decline in willingness of individuals to take responsibility and 
assume obligations.
121
   
 
Again at a more practical level, there has been some national litigation regarding IP 
and human rights, focussing on instrumental human rights: in South Africa, 
considering the relationship between patents, compulsory licensing and parallel 
importing and the constitutional rights to life and health;
122
 in England, considering 
the relationship between parallel importing of branded goods and the ECHR right to 
                                                 
111
 See Shestack, 42-4  
112
 See Shestack, 46-52 
113
 See Shestack, 54-6 
114
 See Davidson, 36/7 and Shestack, 53/4 
115
 See footnote 70 
116
 See eg Kent, 7 
117
 See Shestack, 40-1 
118
 See articles 10, 12 Vienna Declaration  
119
 See articles 20, 28-32 Vienna Declaration 
120
Arguably the birthplace of modern human rights, giving rise to Paine, the enlightenment, and being 
the driving force for much post WW2 activity in international human rights - see Tay, 28-9  
121
 Dalrymple, T. The Spectator 24 April 2004, 20 
122




 and copyright and the ECHR right to freedom of expression;
124
 in the 
United States, considering encroachment of copyright on the public domain and 
constitutional rights;
125
 and in the Netherlands, considering copyright and the 
statutory right of freedom of expression.
126
  Where these cases have been decided, 
however, those seeking to rely on human rights have either been unsuccessful or have 
achieved the outcome which would have resulted if the arguments had merely 
focussed on existing checks within IP regimes, such as the public interest.  That said, 
there are indications that in rare cases, the public interest may include human rights, 
thus providing human rights with a role within an existing framework.
127
   
 
Accordingly, these authorities do not support the suggestion that either IP or human 
rights should be an absolute trump over the other.  They favour the view that, at least 
at practical and instrumental levels, the correct focus is achieving an appropriate 
balance, reflecting the delivery element of the theoretical model suggested above.  
There has been no case law consideration, however, of the relationship between IP 
and the right to development or the right to life, which may produce a differen 
outcome or at least involve a different balancing act.  Further, likely because of the 
breadth of human rights instruments, no cases have considered arguments of alleged 
human rights based solely on theoretical grounds; nor has there been international 
case law considering the fundamental questions identified by the UN Sub 
Commission.   
 
Existing Potential Solutions?                       
 




 Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd [2002] R.P.C.5 (“Ashdown”) 
125
 Eldred v Ashcroft (US) (“Eldred”) see 
<http://www.techlawjournal.com/topstories/2003/200301/5.asp> 
126
 Uitgeverij Byblos B.V. v Joanne Kathleen Rowling, Uiteverij De Harmonie B.V. and Time Warner 
Entertainment Company, LP [2004] E.C.D.R 7 
127
 Ashdown, H10, para 45, H11, para 46, para 47.  See also Krikke, J. Case Comment re Church of 
Scientology v XS4ALL [2004] E.I.P.R. N50   
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Courts in England have looked creatively at the question of the scope of IP.  This led 
to the “spare parts exception” and the concept of non derogation from grant
128
 to 
avoid IP causing unjustifiable restriction on competition and encroachment on 
property.  Significantly, however, notwithstanding their motivation, the House of 
Lords based their decision on English common law and copyright, rather than 
competition or human rights.  They also stressed that the restriction was limited to 
copyright, should not be a basis for encroachment on what it saw as the statutory 
monopolies of patents and registered designs, and urged review and reform of 
copyright legislation.  A reluctance to engage in judicial activism was later seen from 
the Privy Council
129
 who held that the preceding decision stemmed not from law but 
from public policy, which should not have priority over an express statutory right, and 
should only be applied where there was plainly anti-competitive conduct and 
unfairness to consumers.  Subsequently,
130
 it was confirmed that public policy should 
prevail over IP only if “no thinking member of society would dispute its validity”.
131
   
 
Thus, through competition, human rights, overriding questions of public policy and 
the existing exceptions to IP referred to above, potential counters to IP do exist.  
However, the fall out from TRIPS teaches that simply because solutions exist, they 
may not be allowed to be workable.   
 
Although there had been many IP treaties in the past,
132
 TRIPS was groundbreaking.  
It set minimum standards of protection for each IP right, which were higher than those 
in place in many signatory countries.  Further, because the treaty was part of the 
WTO, if countries wished to have other benefits of membership (or promised (but 
rarely delivered) benefits – for example new markets for agriculture for developing 
                                                 
128
 British Leyland Motor Corporation  v Armstrong Patents Company Limited [1986] R.P.C 279 - in 
that case, owing to a combination of existing case law and piecemeal development of copyright and 
design legislation, wide power was conferred on the copyright owner, which could be used to prevent a 
car owner having the car repaired, or obtaining spare parts, other than from an authorised source, where 
they would be very expensive 
129
 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Green Cartridge Company (Hong Kong) Limited [1997] F.S.R 817, 823-
4  
130
 Mars UK Ltd v Teknowledge Ltd [2000] E.C.D.R 99, 105 (“Mars”) 
131
 Mars, 108 
132
 Eg Paris Convention, Berne Convention   
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countries) they were required to provide this protection.
133
  In addition, owing to 
pressure from the developed countries, driven by the attitudes of IP owning 
multinational corporations, useful tools considered above were not explored in a 
manner conducive to bringing about a balanced workable global IP regime.
134
  Indeed, 
it is questionable to what extent there was any genuine dialogue or accord, rather the 
imposition of a fait accompli.
135
   
 
While the general nature of permitted exceptions in TRIPS did leave it open to 
signatories to adopt their own regimes, again pressure from developed countries has 
meant that the failure to entrench has effectively destroyed useful tools.  This has been 
a result of the use by the United States and the EU of bilateral trade agreements,
136
 
and trade and customs legislation
137
 to ensure that partners introduced IP in excess of 
the minimum standards of TRIPS, and did not permit compulsory licensing or parallel 
importing.  This has rightly been strongly criticised,
138
 particularly given increased 
use in both the EU and the United States of compulsory licensing to restrict use of IP 
to inhibit commercial growth and competition,
139
 and in statutory regimes.
140
  The 
power of multinational lobbying, this time from publishers, was also seen in the EU 
when the proposed introduction of a compulsory licence to the new Database Right 
                                                 
133
 See Sherwood,1, 5; Murakyembe, 133. 
134
 Eg parallel importing was specifically not dealt with (article 6), and compulsory licensing merely 
permitted as an option (article 31) – see also footnote 25.    
135
  See Drahos1, 167-9 
136
 See CIPR, 162-3, Chapman, 30, Drahos1, 169  
137
 US based on section 301 Tariff Act; and EU Regulation 264/84 enabling unilateral declarations and 
sanctions if it is considered that a state’s laws breaches US or EU rights under WTO rules.  See also 
Murkyembe, 113 and Drahos, 167-8 
138
 UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  The impact of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on human rights.  Report of the 
High Commissioner.  E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13  27 June 2001 
http://www.hnhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf recommendation 69  
139
 Using a form of the essential facilities doctrine, at least in the United States: EU - if IP right being 
used but consumer demand in separate market not being satisfied - IMS; 28 U.S.C 1498.  See Mercer, I 
“Patent Wrongs” 29 March 2001, CIPR 42 
http://www.mises.org/fullstory.asp?control=641&FS=Patent+Wrongs. (“Mercer”) and Singh, S. 
“Compulsory Licensing Good for US Public, Not Others” <http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/public-
cn.htm>, (“Singh”) 2     
140
 Eg US Copyright Act, s111, 115, 119; sections 237-239 and paragraph 19 Schedule 1 CDPA 




 leading, unusually, to suggestions that general principles both of 
competition law and human rights should be used to deal with issues arising.
142
                      
 
Rather than work with existing rights, another solution is the creation of new rights, 




 Rights, and Farmers’ Rights.
145
  The 
ability to do this is, however, restricted by TRIPS in so far as the subject matter of the 
rights falls within it, given the need to comply with the minimum standards.
146
 
Wholesale or creative reconsideration of IP rights (for example restriction of patent 
term to 10 years, copyright term to 5 years, limited utility model type rights for 
controversial or groundbreaking areas, perhaps with a restriction on when they may be 
enforced) can only be achieved by a revision of TRIPS.  Although this is a goal of its 
many critics, particularly those supporting the cause of developing countries,
147
 the 
nature of its negotiation and the ultimate outcome suggest that this is unlikely.
148
  That 
said, public outcry and NGO lobbying in respect of anti-globalisation and accessing 
medicines, which has limited WTO proceedings against developing countries,
149
 may 
consolidate into a platform for more formal change in this field.                               
 
These issues are highly relevant to progress.  Not only does the status quo involve an 
international standard setting treaty, but given the prevalence of cross border trade and 
the global nature of the social concerns identified at the outset, some form of 
international solution is likely required to produce an effective outcome.  However, 
any solution would not necessarily, and should not, require the imposition of uniform 
                                                 
141
 EC Database Directive (96/9).  See Mirchin, D “The European Database Directive Sets the 
Worldwide Agenda”, <http://www.nfais.org/publications/white_papers_2.htm>3.   
142
 Vaver, D. “Recent Copyright Developments in Europe”, 6 NOTES for a session at the International 
Conference on The Commodification of Information, May 30-31 1999, Faculty of Law, Haifa 
University <www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP0699.html>      
143
 See footnote 141 
144
 See Council Regulation (EC) 6/2002 
145
 These have been introduced in India. See Sahai, S. “India’s Plant Variety Protection and Farmer’s 
Rights Legislation” in Drahos/Mayne, 214-211; and CIPR 67-9 re global bases 
146
 Article 1, TRIPS 
147
 Suggested in Report on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, paras II, B, 8-9; see also Helfer, 48, 
57-9. 
148
 See CIPR, 160 
149
 and indeed general recourse to WTO dispute resolution procedures against developing countries – 





  That said, the experiences of TRIPS,
151





 teach that the power of lobbyists and secondary motives in directing the 
fate of international instruments cannot be ignored, nor can the difficulties posed by 
seeking to harmonise and respect conflicting national norms and economic 
circumstances.  Encouragingly, however, these challenges have not prevented 
ongoing attempts by the international community to address specific problems, for 
example at The World Summit on the Information Society.
154
        
 
In the real world 
 
Achievement of a new formal international regime is also unlikely to be the end of the 
matter.  The review, enforcement and monitoring procedures in place to ensure 
compliance with TRIPS
155
 and human rights instruments
156
 have been of limited 
effect, raising the prospect of any new treaty being disregarded with impunity.  While 
it would be possible for states to turn to WTO dispute solution procedures,
157
 the 
prospects of this being done, and the outcome adhered to, is inextricably linked with 
the respective powers of states and their economic interdependence,
158
 the very 
factors which create problems with the present regime.  Further, as the WTO rules do 
not have direct effect, the scope for impact is always limited.
159
   
 
Effectiveness of dispute resolution is not confined to the international arena.  If an IP 
owner seeks to enforce a right, even if the court action itself may be anti-
                                                 
150
 See criticism of such standards in Macdonald, 35/6 and Drahos, 1  
151
 See above 
152
 See Kent, 37 and 164 
153
 See footnote 73 
154
 World Summit on Information Society – Geneva 2003 – Tunis 2005 – Declaration of Principles 
WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E   
155
 See Arup, 10 – articles 30, 63 and 66 TRIPS are relevant, however little has been done, particularly 
regarding developing countries 
156
 See article 27 and Section E Vienna Declaration; Kent, 184-5  
157
 Article 64 TRIPS provides that disputes relating to implementation are to be dealt with pursuant to 
articles XII and XXIII GATT 1994.  There has been some use of these: see DS 160 and DS 114  
158
 See Chang, P-L. “The Politics of WTO Enforcement Mechanism” 9 January 2004, 21 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=506442> 
159
 See Zonnekeyn, G. A. “The Status of WTO Law in the Community Legal Order: Some Comments 




 or the threat of it unjustified,
161
 time, cost, commercial pressures and 
fear of failure in court may lead to concessions being made to resolve the situation.  
This could result in the IP owner gaining benefits to which they are not strictly 
entitled.  The prospects of this are increased if there is forum shopping
162
 (likely an 
option in international situations and permitted by many courts) with a jurisdiction 
chosen which favours IP owners and is unfamiliar to the alleged infringer.  Further, 
there is the possibility of essentially same dispute being fought over national rights in 
several courts, with different results:
163
 the prospect of this is again likely more 
appealing to the IP owner.  
 
Accordingly, economic power and the attitudes of IP owners are fundamental to what 
will happen in practice, whatever can be achieved at a higher level.
164
  As a result, 





 fields, is likely to be a more productive 
means, and opportunity,
167
 of preventing perceived abuses of IP.  This may result in 
states and corporations being encouraged to reach, and abide by, more morally 
acceptable international arrangements, and some progress has already been made in 
this regard.
168
  This may be fuelled by the increased value placed by individuals on 
global social issues, the rise of individual involvement in NGO and single issue 
                                                 
160
 ITT v Promedia, [1998] ECR II-2937   
161
 see section 70 PA and section 21 TMA 
162
 where choice is made between more than one jurisdiction which would be entitled to hear the case – 
examples of relevant rules are found in the UK Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982   
163
 Eg  UK (EP) and German (EP) patent infringement disputes heard in the England and German 
courts respectively with different outcomes       
164
 See also Klein, XXII re superseding of government by corporations 
165
 See Monsanto’s decision in May 2004 to cease commercialisation of Roundup Ready, due to 
pressure from activists, consumers and US and Canadian farmers: Phillips, P “Seeds of doubt over 
Monsanto decision” 12 May 2004 <http://www.globeandmail.com> 
166
 See reduced prices in Africa of Merck and Bristol Myers - Mercer; and activities of Centre for the 
Management of Intellectual Property and Health Research and Development, encouraging balanced and 
ethical licensing (see <http://www.mihr.org/>) 
167
 Klein, 361 
168
 Eg United Nations Global Compact (see 
<http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/workers_rights/wr_other/wr_other.htm>); Norms of Responsibility 
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises in Regard to Human Rights for the 
United Nations (“UN Norms”) <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/norms-Aug 2003.html> of UN 
Human Rights Sub-Commission (August 2003), to bring about greater accountability of business.  See 
also Speeches of The 2003 Business and Human Rights Seminar 9 December 2003, London, 
<http://www.business-and-human-rights-seminar.org/docs/Speeches.pdf>, 20-2, particularly regarding 




 and growth elsewhere of human rights approaches
170
 which could also be 
applied to IP.
171
  Such an inclusive approach is indeed consistent with theories of the 
legitimacy of law, which stems not only from court decisions and imposed legislation, 
but the values of the underlying society.
172
                    
 
Against this backdrop, it is perhaps not surprising that there has been discussion of 
new means of encouraging and sharing innovation, without reliance on conventional 
IP rights.  Increased collaboration between the private and public sectors with Public 
Private Partnerships and the use of Private Finance Initiative to fund projects has been 
suggested,
173
 as has the use of open source principles to share knowledge the subject 
of IP.
174
  Such suggestions have also been fuelled by concerns as to the rights 
obtained by private interests over developments and material which arguably should 




This raises basic questions about the political structure and beliefs of modern global 
society (to the extent that it in fact exists).  Increased public funding and activity are 
unlikely in capitalist societies, with their increase focus on private funding.
176
  Even if 
the money were available, political will to impose such a system may be lacking, 
particularly given the power of IP owning corporations; in any event, a detailed 
review of management and infrastructure would be required to ensure that the 
differing focuses of public and private innovation continued to be met.
177
.  However, 
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 See CIPR, 130; Mellor, N. “IP management in global healthcare” Scrip Magazine March 2003, 6  
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“Share and Protect: Copyleft Licences and Global Technology Transfer” 
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 2004, The Economist Technology Quarterly, 15  
175
 See also footnote 23 
176
 See Chapman, 24-5 
177
 Gutterman, 140-1 
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even abandonment of capitalism would be unlikely to assist, as research and 
development has not prospered in socialist/Marxist regimes, with IP systems being 
introduced to encourage activity and foreign collaboration.
178
  Accordingly, private 
rights over innovation and creativity appear likely to continue in some form.    
       
Contribution            
 
My research will build on and combine the existing writings, legislation and case law 
regarding rationales for different forms of IP; the need for restriction on some or all 
IP; the potential roles of competition and human rights in this regard; means by which 
new systems of IP could be implemented and enforced; the practical importance and 
legal relevance of corporate social responsibility and evolving social conscience; and 
identify effective and enforceable means, normative or organic, through which legal 
doctrines can be used to address areas of global social concern perceived to be caused 
by IP.    
 
Although increasing work is being done in the fields of competition and IP, and 
human rights, corporate social responsibility and IP, the inter-disciplinary nature of 
my work is unique.  The combination of the three fields, and reference to wider social 
and philosophical principles, is important to provide a holistic legal solution for use 
both now and in the future when new issues will doubtless arise with further emerging 
technologies.  The alternative is for international and national legal progress to be 
driven by economic considerations and the interests of the developed world and 
multinational corporations, with humanitarian and social concerns seeking to redress 
the balance, producing increasingly polarised views and split societies.  Such an 
outcome would deprive IP, and the law generally, of its legitimacy.                                     
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